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Introduction
It's to hell with the future and live on the past:
May the Lord in His mercy be kind to Belfast. 1
In Belfast, Northern Ireland, the fear and uncertainty of the past are
slowly giving way to a welcome sense of optimism. The city, once scarred
by security checkpoints, military patrols, and the destruction of bombing
campaigns, is awash in new development projects, and tourists are visiting
t J.D. / LL.M. in International and Comparative Law, candidate, Cornell Law
School, expected 2006; B.A., University of Virginia, 2000. This note was selected for
presentation at the Yale Journal of International Law Young Scholars Conference, New
Haven, Connecticut, March 4, 2006. The author thanks Professor Brice Dickson of
Queen's University, Belfast for his insightful comments, and Ariel Gordon, Will
Feldman, and Eliot Walker for their valuable editing.
1. Maurice James Craig, Ballad to a Traditional Refrain, reprinted in TONY PARKER,
MAY THE LORD IN His MERCY BE KIND TO BELFAST (1994).
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in increasing numbers. 2 The prospect of a return to the sustained violence
of the past is increasingly remote. In July 2005, the Irish Republican Army
(IRA) announced an end to its armed campaign, 3 and in September it
reportedly fulfilled its promise to "completely and permanently disman-
tle[ ] its weaponry." 4 Responding to these initiatives, the British Army has
scaled back its presence throughout Northern Ireland, halving the number
of troops in the province and tearing down the watchtowers that cast a
grim shadow over many neighborhoods.5
Behind these outward signs of rejuvenation, however, lurks the legacy
of Northern Ireland's decades-long conflict, known locally as "the Trou-
bles." Just weeks before the IRA announced the destruction of its weapons,
Belfast witnessed its worst rioting in years as pro-British Protestants
unhappy with the current peace process attacked policemen and destroyed
property.6 The riots served as a reality check "[t]o anyone who thought the
'Peace Process' was all done and dusted and that it is now just a matter of
truth and reconciliation." 7 Northern Ireland remains a deeply divided
society: divided by national and religious identities, by contentious views
of history, and by differing aspirations for the future.
Northern Ireland is not the first society to grapple with the question of
transitional justice-that is, the question of how to deal with the legacies of
past conflict as part of a larger process of political transformation. 8 The
wave of democratization. that occurred throughout the world during the
1980s and 1990s forced many states to confront similar issues. Some of
these states established truth commissions as mechanisms through which
to achieve transitional justice.9 Among these, the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) in South Africa is the most well-publicized and influen-
tial example.10 The perceived successes of the South African TRC, as well
as of the truth commission model in general, have made truth commissions
a popular option for finding the truth and promoting justice in a wide
range of post-conflict societies. Recently, the U.S. government has consid-
2. See Mary Jordan, Pursuing Peace, and Prosperity, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2005, at
A18.
3. See Brian Lavery & Alan Cowell, I.R.A. Renounces Use of Violence; Vows to Dis-
arm, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2005, at Al.
4. See Brian Lavery, Destruction of I.R.A.'s Arms is Confirmed by Monitors, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2005, at A4.
5. See Jordan, supra note 2.
6. See Brian Lavery, Protestants Say Anger and Alienation are Fueling Riots in Belfast,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at A3.
7. Chris Moffat, Reconciliation Goes Bach to School, FORTNIGHT, Oct. 2005, at 4.
8. See generally RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000) (exploring how socie-
ties making a transition from conflict to peaceful democracy cope with the injustices of
the past).
9. See generally PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: FACING THE CHALLENGE
OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (2002) (providing a comprehensive overview of all twenty-one
truth commissions that operated between 1974 and 2002).
10. The literature on the TRC is extraordinarily large. Two useful introductions are:
ANTJIE KROG, COUNTRY OF MY SKULL: GUILT, SORROW, AND THE LIMITS OF FORGIVENESS IN
THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA (1998) and MARTIN MEREDITH, COMING TO TERMS: SOUTH AFRICA'S
SEARCH FOR TRUTH (1999). Other sources are cited throughout this note.
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ered establishing a truth commission to investigate Saddam Hussein's
regime in Iraq, 1 while Spanish judge Baltasar Garzon, well-known for
bringing criminal charges against former Chilean dictator Augusto
Pinochet, has called for a truth commission to document the abuses car-
ried out by the Franco regime, which ruled Spain from 1939 to 1975.12
This note examines the prospects for applying the truth commission
model in Northern Ireland. It argues that, although Northern Ireland faces
significant and unique obstacles to any form of official truth-seeking, the
implementation of a transitional justice mechanism that confronts the leg-
acy of the Troubles is crucial for the future of the peace process, and would
serve as an important example for other societies undergoing similar
processes of conflict resolution. Part I examines the theory and practice of
truth commissions. Part II describes the Troubles and identifies aspects of
the conflict that highlight both the need for some process of truth-seeking
in Northern Ireland as well as the difficulties such a process would face.
Part III critiques three recent truth-seeking initiatives in Northern Ireland:
the Report of the Northern Ireland Victims' Commissioner, a series of deci-
sions by the European Court of Human Rights, and the Bloody Sunday
Inquiry. Part IV sketches the basic shape of a future Northern Irish truth
commission, keeping in mind both the benefits and limitations of the truth
commission model, as well as the particular historical and political circum-
stances of Northern Ireland. In doing so, it provides a framework for con-
sidering the applicability of the truth commission model in other post-
conflict societies. The note concludes by asserting that a process of official
truth-seeking is necessary in order for Northern Ireland to come to terms
with its difficult past and build a more peaceful future.
I. Truth Commissions in Theory and Practice
What is meant by the term "truth commission"? In her comprehensive
study of such bodies, Priscilla B. Hayner identifies a set of basic character-
istics shared by all truth commissions. First, truth commissions focus on
the past. Second, they investigate a pattern of abuses occurring over time,
rather than a single event. Third, truth commissions are temporary bodies
that normally operate anywhere from six months to two years and com-
plete their work with the submission of a report. Finally, truth commis-
sions are officially sanctioned or empowered by the state. 13
Truth commissions often share similar goals. One common goal is to
establish the "truth" by conducting an official inquiry into the facts of the
11. See WORKING GROUP ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN IRAQ, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN
POST-SADDAM IRAQ: THE ROAD TO RE-ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW AND RESTORING CIVIL
SOCIETY 6-15 (2003), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS36686 [hereinaf-
ter TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN IRAQ].
12. Daniel Trotta, Spain's Garzon Calls for 'Truth Commission' on Franco, REUTERS,
Feb. 27, 2005.
13. HAYNER, supra note 9, at 14.
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conflict and establishing a record of past abuse. 14 Based on this official
inquiry, truth commissions are often expected to "pave the way for . . .
justice . . . and . . . reparation"15-that is, to serve as a foundation for
criminal prosecutions or other judicial proceedings, to recommend institu-
tional reforms, or to provide a basis for financial compensation to vic-
tims.1 6 More broadly, truth commissions are charged with healing the
wounds of past violence and preventing future conflict. This may be
achieved through the "three C's": cleansing of individuals, community-
building, and consolidation of political change.17 Individual victims are
given the opportunity to tell their stories and obtain official acknowledg-
ment of their suffering.' 8 At the societal level, "moral reconstruction" is
achieved by tackling the difficult issues raised by past wrongs' 9 -a process
often viewed as facilitating reconciliation between previously antagonistic
segments of the community.20 Lastly, by dealing openly and effectively
with the past, truth commissions are viewed as essential for reinforcing the
process of political transition and laying the foundation of the new political
order.21
The extent to which truth commissions can, should, or do fulfill any of
these goals is a matter of intense debate. 22 It is necessary to recognize that,
within the basic framework presented by Hayner, truth commissions vary
widely in terms of their structures, mandates, goals, and achievements. 23
This is particularly important to note in light of the tremendous impact of
the South African TRC, 24 whose influence has been so great that its unique
14. See Rodolfo Mattarollo, Truth Commissions, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 295,
298-99 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002); see also HAYNER, supra note 9, at 24-27.
15. Mattarollo, supra note 14, at 302.
16. Id. at 302-05; HAYNER, supra note 9, at 28-30.
17. TRUTH COMMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 22-23 (Henry J. Steiner ed.,
1997).
18. See HAYNER, supra note 9, at 28.
19. TRUTH COMMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT, supra note 17, at 16-17.
20. See HAYNER, supra note 9, at 30-31.
21. See TEITEL, supra note 8, at 69 ("[A] historical inquiry and record that assimilates
the evil past is necessary to restore the collective in periods of radical political change.");
TRUTH COMMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT, supra note 17, at 20 ("This process [of
unveiling the truth] can help reclaim a public space around which a fractured sense of
political community can once again be reconstructed.").
22. See generally TRUTH COMMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT, supra note 17
(presenting a discussion between leading scholars of truth commissions in which issues
such as the purpose of these bodies, their institutional design, and the applicability of
the truth commission model to a wide range of conflict situations are addressed).
23. For a description of the ways in which the truth commission model has func-
tioned in different contexts, see HAYNER, supra note 9, at 32-71.
24. The TRC has influenced the debate over truth commissions and transitional jus-
tice in a number of countries. See, e.g., Aeyal M. Gross, The Constitution, Reconciliation,
and Transitional Justice: Lessons from South Africa and Israel, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 47
(2004); Brandon Hamber, Rights and Reasons: Challenges for Truth Recovery in South
Africa and Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1074 (2003); Catherine Jenkins, A
Truth Commission for East Timor: Lessons from South Africa?, 7J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L.
233 (2002); Maryam Kamali, Accountability for Human Rights Violations: A Comparison
of Transitional Justice in East Germany and South Africa, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 89
(2001).
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structures are often viewed as paradigmatic of the entire truth commission
model. 25 It is therefore useful to make three important, though often over-
looked, observations about the nature of truth commissions.
First, given that there is no universally applicable model of a truth
commission, it follows that each truth commission will reflect the unique
political transition in which it is established. In other words, truth commis-
sions, like all mechanisms of transitional justice, are "alternately consti-
tuted by, and constitutive of, the transition."26 As a threshold matter, the
decision to create a truth commission is profoundly influenced by the cir-
cumstances prevailing in the transitional society. In many instances, legal
actors, such as the police and judiciary, are viewed as too weak or compro-
mised to properly investigate, try, and convict or exonerate those accused
of past crimes. 27 This was the case in Chile where key figures from the
former military regime remained in positions of authority after the transi-
tion, effectively blocking the possibility of successful prosecutions and
making a truth commission the more feasible option.28 Furthermore, even
where adequate prosecutions are at least technically possible-as was the
case in South Africa-post-conflict societies might opt for the "soft law"
approach offered by truth commissions in order to achieve broader transi-
tional goals, such as the compilation of a thorough account of the conflict
and the fostering of reconciliation between past enemies.29
Once a truth commission has been established, its contours will con-
tinue to be defined by the nature of the past conflict and the imperatives of
the political transition. In Chile, the critical role played by the former mili-
tary regime in post-conflict society created a situation in which many past
abuses were shielded from public scrutiny by a blanket amnesty provi-
sion,30 and the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation was pre-
vented from publishing the names of perpetrators in its report. 31 The truth
commission created in Germany in 1992, following that country's reunifi-
cation, was also shaped by the particular nature of its transition. In order
to account for the far-reaching, repressive tactics of the East German com-
munist regime, the Commission of Inquiry for the Assessment of History
and Consequences of the SED Dictatorship in Germany focused its atten-
25. See, e.g., TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN IRAQ, supra note 11, at 7 (linking the process of
truth-seeking with the issue of amnesty and the goal of reconciliation, two central char-
acteristics of the South African TRC, though not necessarily of the truth commission
model in general).
26. TEITEL, supra note 8, at 6.
27. See Benjamin N. Schiff, Do Truth Commissions Promote Accountability or Impu-
nity? The Case of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in POsT-CON-
FLICT JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 325, 328.
28. See RAYNER, supra note 9, at 35-38.
29. See Schiff, supra note 27, at 328-29.
30. See HAYNER, supra note 9, at 97-98 (describing the amnesty program imple-
mented by General Augusto Pinochet prior to his agreeing to relinquish control over the
country).
31. See id. at 111 -15. See generally REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION (Phillip E. Berryman trans., 2 vols. 1993) (detailing the find-
ings of the Chilean commission).
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tion on examining the massive files maintained by the East German gov-
ernment.32 In addition to allowing for extensive academic research into
East Germany's authoritarian policies, this process opened up the files to
scrutiny by former East German citizens 3 3 and formed the basis of a policy
of lustration, whereby former functionaries of the East German regime
were removed from public positions.34
The South African TRC undoubtedly reflected the political realities of
the transition from apartheid to non-racial democracy. Indeed, the estab-
lishment of a truth commission was a cornerstone of the entire transitional
process.3 5 Perhaps no aspect of the TRC was as influenced by South
Africa's unique political considerations as its widely-discussed amnesty
provisions, under which perpetrators of past abuses could receive immu-
nity from both criminal and civil prosecutions provided they (1) submitted
an application to the TRC fully disclosing their role in past crimes, and (2)
demonstrated that these crimes were politically-motivated. 3 6 This amnesty
program was viewed as an essential prerequisite in order for the white
minority regime to relinquish power.37 According to Richard J. Goldstone,
Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa and judge for the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the TRC's
amnesty program "was a political compromise more than a moral impera-
tive. The political compromise was that there would be amnesties, but only
in return for full confession, and that incentive-scheme is unique to the
South African form of Truth Commission."38
A discussion of the amnesty process in South Africa leads into a sec-
ond critical observation on the nature of truth commissions: conventional
wisdom regarding the existence of a bright line between truth commissions
(providing "truth" but little 'Justice") and criminal prosecutions (providing
'Justice" but little "truth") can be misleading. Although there are certainly
differences in both the degree and kind of "truth" and "justice" offered by
these two mechanisms, 3 9 uncompromising proponents of the criminal
32. See HAYNER, supra note 9, at 61-62.
33. See id. at 62. Hayner notes:
Files of the East German Stasi, the omnipresent secret police, were made accessi-
ble for individual review. These files allowed those who had been victims of
Stasi informers to discover who had been reporting on them and to confront
those informers in person-either privately or, as was done on a number of
occasions, in front of television cameras.
Id.
34. See id. at 13.
35. See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (S. Afr.)
(providing for the establishment of the TRC).
36. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act ss. 16-22. For the com-
plete, official report on the amnesty process in South Africa, see 6 TRUTH AND RECONCILI-
ATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT (6 vols. 1998).
37. See MEREDITH, supra note 10, at 20-21.
38. Richard J. Goldstone, Past Human Rights Violations: Truth Commissions and
Amnesties or Prosecutions, 51 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 164, 169 (2000).
39. See, e.g., Schiff, supra note 27, at 327-28, 332-40 (analyzing the basic differ-
ences between truth commissions and criminal prosecutions).
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prosecution model 40 overlook the extent to which truth commissions can
play a positive role in facilitating "justice."
First, the findings of truth commissions can be used in the course of
future criminal proceedings. This was the case with the world's first signif-
icant truth commission report, which detailed the "disappearances" that
occurred under the military junta that ruled Argentina between 1976 and
1983.41 Following its publication, prosecutors relied heavily on the evi-
dence gathered in the report in order to bring charges against nine leading
members of the military regime. 4 2 The work of truth commissions played a
similar role in attempts at prosecutions in Uganda and Haiti,4 3 while in El
Salvador the report of the United Nations-sponsored Commission on the
Truth for El Salvador 4 4 arguably opened the door for the possibility of
future prosecutions. 45 It should be noted that, to the extent that prosecu-
tions in these countries were only marginally successful, this is not due to a
failing of the truth commission model per se, but rather to larger deficien-
cies in the transitional process. 46 Even in South Africa, the TRC's amnesty
provision paradoxically facilitated prosecutions "[slince all parties to the
South African conflict, including the security forces, agreed to a process
that permits punishment of those who failed to apply or were denied
amnesty .... -47 Indeed, several high-ranking officials of the apartheid
regime were brought to trial for their crimes. 48
Truth commissions can also advance non-prosecutorial forms of jus-
tice. In many instances, truth commission reports have recommended that
reparations be paid to victims. Although disputes have inevitably arisen
over the effectiveness and adequacy of such policies, reparations programs
40. See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991) (arguing that criminal
prosecutions are the best method of establishing guilt or innocence, publicizing past
criminality, and preventing future abuses).
41. The Argentine commission's findings are detailed in NUNCA MAs: THE REPORT OF
THE ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARED (1986).
42. See HAYNER, supra note 9, at 93-94.
43. See id. at 94-97.
44. FROM MADNESS TO HOPE: THE TWELVE YEAR WAR IN EL SALVADOR, REPORT OF THE
UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON THE TRUTH FOR EL SALVADOR, U.N. Doc. S/25500 (1993).
45. See Paul Seils, The Limits of Truth Commissions in the Search for Justice: An Analy-
sis of the Truth Commissions of El Salvador and Guatemala and Their Effect in Achieving
Post-Conflict Justice, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 775, 781 -84.
46. See HAYNER, supra note 9, at 94-97 (explaining that the incompleteness of the
political transitions limited the effectiveness of prosecutions in Uganda and Haiti); Seils,
supra note 45, at 781-84 (identifying a broad amnesty provision passed by the Salvado-
ran government at the time of the truth commission's report as the most significant
obstacle to successful prosecutions).
47. See Paul van Zyl, Unfinished Business: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission's
Contribution to Justice in Post-Apartheid South Africa, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra
note 14, at 745, 755.
48. See MEREDITH, supra note 10, at 46-54 (recounting the trial and conviction of
Eugene de Kock, infamous leader of a police death squad), 153-63 (describing charges
against Dr. Wouter Basson, accused of developing a program of germ warfare to be used
against Africans), and 355 (noting the trial and acquittal of Defense Minister Magnus
Malan).
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have been implemented in Argentina, Chile, South Africa, El Salvador, and
Guatemala. 49 Additionally, truth commissions almost universally recom-
mend institutional reforms in order to prevent future conflicts and human
rights abuses: these have included recommendations to reform the judicial
system, the armed forces, and the political system; uphold international
human rights norms; prosecute certain offenders or remove them from
positions of authority; and undertake further investigations into patterns
of past abuse. 50 Lastly, at the most basic level, truth commissions allow
victims to tell their stories publicly and receive official acknowledgment of
their suffering, a process that carries benefits even where such acknowl-
edgment is not reinforced through judicial proceedings.5 1
Conversely, it is worth noting that criminal prosecutions can play an
important role in establishing truth. Even during periods of political tran-
sition, criminal justice mechanisms are the paradigmatic way in which a
state determines what happened, who is to blame, and what should be
done in order to compensate the victim.5 2 Records of trial proceedings can
serve as useful repositories for the truth of painful events. For example, the
records of the Nuremberg Tribunals and other prosecutions of Nazi war
criminals have long served as sources of information regarding the Holo-
caust and other atrocities committed during World War 11.5 3 Even the
ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), despite
their notable failings and deficiencies, have provided at least some degree
of "truth" regarding the staggering violence associated with the genocides
in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 54
In any event, "truth" and "justice" are slippery terms that take on dif-
ferent meanings in different contexts. Regardless of the transitional justice
mechanisms they choose to employ, all post-conflict societies must at some
level face the question of whether they are seeking "individual" truth or
justice, aimed at individual victims and perpetrators, or "overall" truth or
49. See HAYNER, supra note 9, at 328-31 (comparing the reparations programs in
Argentina and Chile); Seils, supra note 45, at 784, 792-93 (highlighting the shortcom-
ings of plans for reparations in El Salvador and Guatemala); van Zyl, supra note 47, at
755-58 (critiquing the reparations program in South Africa).
50. See HAYNER, supra note 9, at 320-27 (charting recommendations for institutional
reform made by truth commissions in Argentina, Chad, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala,
South Africa, and Uganda).
51. See TRUTH COMMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE AsSESSMENT, supra note 17, at 23 (argu-
ing that examination of individual cases of abuse can achieve a useful level of "public
acknowledgement" of both victimization and guilt).
52. See TEITEL, supra note 8, at 30 ("Trials offer a way to express both public condem-
nation of past violence and the legitimation of the rule of law necessary to the consolida-
tion of future democracy.").
53. Id. at 31-33 (discussing the significance of Nuremberg); see also HANNAH
ADENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (rev. ed. 1964) (pro-
viding an account of Nazi war crimes through a firsthand report of Israel's trial of Nazi
war criminal Adolf Eichmann).
54. See generally Payam Akhavan, Justice in The Hague, Peace in the Former Yugosla-
via? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 737
(1998) (arguing that the ICTY has contributed to the search for truth in the former
Yugoslavia, and supporting the role of international criminal tribunals generally in the
process of truth-seeking).
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justice, aimed more broadly at society. Where truth is aimed at the indi-
vidual level, truth commissions must exhaustively account for the suffering
of all victims and the crimes of all perpetrators. 55 Similarly, criminal pro-
ceedings would require a comprehensive series of prosecutions relating to
all offenses committed.5 6 The reverse is true at the overall level: truth com-
missions can achieve societal truth by documenting and publicizing partic-
ular incidents notable for their "symbolic" representation of larger patterns
of violence, 57 while criminal prosecutions can serve the interests of justice
by punishing high-ranking perpetrators or those "small fish" whose crimes
are particularly egregious. 58
In practice, post-conflict societies will aim, not for strict individual or
overall truth and justice, but for a balance of the two-and this balance will
inevitably involve trade-offs that leave some members of society unhappy.
Thus, in South Africa, the families of three high-profile victims challenged
the constitutionality of the TRC on the grounds that the process failed to
produce truth and served to deny them justice by blocking the possibility
of prosecution.5 9 Additionally, at least one observer criticized the TRC for
limiting the definition of "victims" to encompass only those who suffered
serious bodily harm, thereby failing to account for those injured by
apartheid's unfair social and economic policies. 60 Meanwhile, in Rwanda,
despite the best efforts of both the ICTR and Rwandan government to pros-
ecute the many thousands of genocidaires, the sheer enormity of this task,
and the time- and resource-consuming nature of individual prosecutions,
have left many Rwandans feeling that justice has been far from done. 61
55. See Hamber, supra note 24, at 1081-82 (arguing that the TRC in South Africa
would have been more effective had it "emphasiz[ed] the imperative of finding the truth
and doing as much justice as possible in every case").
56. See generally Orentlicher, supra note 40 (arguing that states have a duty to pur-
sue an aggressive prosecutorial response to past crimes).
57. See Mattarollo, supra note 14, at 305-06 (suggesting that symbolic documenta-
tion of certain cases is the best method of establishing "overall truth" in most contexts).
58. See Akhavan, supra note 54, at 774-82 (highlighting the ways in which the ICTY
might establish "optimal truth" and justice in the former Yugoslavia by prosecuting cer-
tain cases).
59. Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 1996
(4) SA 671 (CC) (S. Afr.) (upholding the constitutionality of the TRC in the face of a
challenge brought by victims' families, including the family of murdered Black Con-
sciousness Movement leader Steve Biko).
60. Mahmood Mamdani, Reconciliation Without Justice, 46 S. AFRICAN REV. Boots 3
(1996). But cf. van Zyl, supra note 47, at 748-50 (pointing out that the TRC did, in fact,
devote an entire volume of its report to explaining how apartheid operated as a system,
thereby expanding its definition of victimization to encompass those harmed by broader
patterns of discrimination and inequality (citing 2 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMIS-
SION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT (6 vols. 1998))). The legacy of apartheid-era inequalities
is undoubtedly a critical issue in South Africa. See, e.g., Government of the Republic of S.
Afr. v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (criticizing the South African government for
failing to live up to its promises of housing reform, and finding that the state has a
positive obligation to uphold the socioeconomic rights of the least privileged members
of society).
61. See William A. Schabas, The Rwanda Case: Sometimes It's Impossible, in POST-
CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 499, 500 ( "Rwanda has found its principled attempt
to prosecute all who were responsible for genocide to be quite unrealistic.").
Cornell International Law Journal
The impossibility of achieving universal satisfaction with the work of
any one transitional justice mechanism highlights a third observation
about truth commissions: truth commissions cannot single-handedly achieve
all the goals of transitional justice, including the oft-cited goal of reconciliation.
Reconciliation implies a lack of bitterness in political and other public rela-
tionships, a dialogue between former enemies based on the present rather
than the past, and a single, unified version of past events.62 Despite having
been an explicit goal of only three truth commissions (in Chile, South
Africa, and Sierra Leone), 63 and despite being dismissed as impractical
and unattainable in places like Argentina and Sri Lanka, 64 the concept of
reconciliation factors into practically every discussion of the truth commis-
sion model. 6 5
Truth commissions, however, "are not magic wands. ' '66 Instead, they
form part of a larger process of transitional justice that includes other ini-
tiatives, such as compensation schemes, prosecutions, and institutional
reforms. In other words, truth commissions should not be viewed as the
ultimate means by which to achieve the goal of reconciliation, but rather as
a means by which to establish a foundation of shared historical truths
upon which the entire complex process of post-conflict transition may rest.
One scholar's observation that "[a] fifth-grade history textbook might be a
truth commission for the next generation"6 7 captures the subtle yet
profound way in which the work of truth commissions might ultimately
help the cause of reconciliation in deeply divided societies by providing a
basic, common view of history. The publication of a truth commission
report is not an invitation to close the book on the past. Instead, it is an
opportunity to understand the past, learn from it, and turn the page in
favor of a more peaceful future.
These three observations-that truth commissions are highly political
bodies, that they are capable of delivering both truth and justice, and that
they are a stepping-stone rather than an endpoint for the goal of reconcilia-
tion-provide instructive guidelines for examining the role that truth com-
missions might play in any post-conflict society. They are particularly
relevant to a discussion of prospects for a truth commission in Northern
Ireland.
62. HAYNER, supra note 9, at 161-63. But cf. Hamber, supra note 24, at 1079-87
(contending that, in South Africa, the concept of "reconciliation" was used as a cover for
denying victims' rights in order to maintain political compromises).
63. See HAYNER, supra note 9, at 154-60 (describing the centrality of reconciliation
to the agendas of the South African and Chilean truth commissions); 1 WITNESS TO
TRUTH: REPORT OF THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 24-25 (3 vols.
2004) (identifying the promotion of "healing and reconciliation" as one of the Sierra
Leone commission's primary objectives).
64. See HAYNER, supra note 9, at 160-61.
65. See, e.g., TRUTH COMMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT, supra note 17, at
13-38.
66. Id. at 30.
67. Id. at 78.
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11. The Troubles and the Truth
Even in comparison to the troubled histories of other deeply divided
societies, Northern Ireland's history is particularly long, complex, and vio-
lent. 68 The roots of the modern conflict can be traced to the 1920 Govern-
ment of Ireland Act, by which Britain partitioned the island of Ireland into
two political entities: the twenty-six-county Irish Free State (later the
Republic of Ireland), which became independent in 1921, and the six-
county province of Northern Ireland, which remained part of the United
Kingdom. 6 9 Partition polarized Northern Ireland's two antagonistic com-
munities: the Unionist (or Loyalist) majority, mostly Protestant and
descended from seventeenth-century British settlers, which viewed itself as
politically, culturally, and economically British, and wished to remain
within the United Kingdom; 70 and the Nationalist (or Republican) minor-
ity, overwhelmingly Catholic and of indigenous Irish descent, which
viewed itself as politically, culturally, and economically Irish, and therefore
opposed partition and desired inclusion in a united, independent Ire-
land.7 1 From 1921 to 1972, Northern Ireland was ruled by a local, Union-
ist-dominated parliament, and discrimination against Catholics existed in
areas such as voting, education, housing, and employment. 7 2 Discrimina-
tion, coupled with the lingering issues of national identity and the legiti-
68. Knowledge of the full context of the conflict in Northern Ireland is useful for
discussing the applicability of the truth commission model, but falls outside the scope of
this note. Fortunately, there is a wealth of helpful books on the subject. Historical
accounts include: JONATHAN BARDON, A HISTORY OF ULSTER (1992) (providing a detailed
history of the Irish province of Ulster-two-thirds of which comprise Northern Ireland-
from the Stone Age through the beginning of the peace process in the early 1990s); TIM
PAT COOGAN, THE TROUBLES: IRELAND'S ORDEAL 1966-1996 AND THE SEARCH FOR PEACE
(1996) (offering a comprehensive background to the Troubles and recounting events
through the 1994 paramilitary ceasefires); and DAVID McKITTCK & DAVID MCVEA, MAK-
ING SENSE OF THE TROUBLES (2003) (covering the conflict from the creation of Northern
Ireland in 1920 through the 1998 Good Friday Agreement and subsequent develop-
ments). The best firsthand account of the Northern Ireland conflict remains JOHN CON-
ROY, BELFAST DIARY: WAR AS A WAY OF LIFE (2d ed. 1995), which records the impressions
of an American journalist living in the working-class Catholic neighborhoods of west
Belfast during the turbulent early 1980s. For political science examinations of the Trou-
bles, see JOHN McGARRY & BRENDAN O'LEARY, EXPLAINING NORTHERN IRELAND (1995),
which critiques the predominant political, historical, economic, social, and religious
explanations of the Troubles, and JONATHAN TONGE, NORTHERN IRELAND: CONFLICT AND
CHANGE (2d ed. 2002), which presents a concise political overview of the Troubles, with
specific emphasis on aspects of the Good Friday Agreement.
69. Government of Ireland Act, 1920, 13 Geo. 5 (Eng.).
70. For historical and political background on Northern Ireland's Protestant com-
munity, see GEOFFREY BELL, THE PROTESTANTS OF ULSTER (2d ed. 1978); STEVE BRUCE, THE
EDGE OF THE UNION: THE ULSTER LOYALIST POLITICAL VISION (1994); PETER TAYLOR, LOYAL-
ISTS: WAR AND PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1999); and SUSAN McKAY, NORTHERN PROTES-
TANTS: AN UNSETTLED PEOPLE (2d ed. 2005).
71. For historical and political background on Northern Ireland's Catholic commu-
nity, see CONROY, supra note 68; PETER TAYLOR, BEHIND THE MASK: THE IRA AND SINN FEIN
(1997); and MARIANNE ELLIOTT, THE CATHOLICS OF ULSTER (2001).
72. The most well-known and scathing critique of this period in Northern Ireland's
history is MICHAEL FARRELL, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ORANGE STATE (2d ed. 1980), which
argues that the state of Northern Ireland was inherently anti-democratic and discrimina-
tory against both the Catholic minority and the local working-class as a whole. But cf.
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macy of the Northern Irish state, prompted a civil rights movement in the
late 1960s, which in turn precipitated a Unionist backlash and the onset of
the recent Troubles. 73
From the late 1960s through the 1990s, over 3,700 individuals died as
the result of political violence in Northern Ireland-a figure that would
translate into roughly 500,000 deaths had a conflict of similar scale
occurred in the U.S.74 Parties to this conflict included both non-state and
state actors: the IRA and smaller armed Republican groups; Loyalist
paramilitaries, most notably the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) and
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF); the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the
province's largely Protestant police force; and the British Army and secret
service. Attempts at political settlement, notably the 1973 Sunningdale
Agreement and 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, failed to achieve peace and
stability. 75
A breakthrough came in 1994, when both the IRA and Loyalist
paramilitaries declared ceasefires. 76 The 1998 Good Friday Agreement,
negotiated by the governments of the UK and the Republic of Ireland, as
well as the majority of Northern Ireland's political parties, grew out of this
cessation of hostilities. The Agreement attempts to establish a workable
solution to the Troubles by means of a three-tiered system: (1) a Northern
Ireland Assembly in which power is shared by Unionists and Nationalists;
(2) a North-South Ministerial Council focusing on issues of common con-
cern to Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland; and (3) a British-
Irish Council to coordinate the Northern Ireland policies of the UK and the
Republic.77
The Good Friday Agreement has produced what may be characterized
as a fragile and incomplete peace in Northern Ireland. When the Assembly
has been operational, Unionist and Nationalist politicians have worked rea-
sonably well together on non-contentious issues such as health, education,
and finance. 7 8 On more divisive issues, however, there has been little coop-
eration, and as a result Northern Ireland's local government has been sus-
pended since October 2002. 79  Among such divisive issues,
"decommissioning"-the term used to describe the process by which
ELLIOTT, supra note 71, at 383-94 (contending that, although discrimination against
Catholics existed, it was neither as institutionalized nor prevalent as often described).
73. See MCKITrrCK & McVEA, supra note 68, at 53-75 (explaining Northern Ire-
land's descent into violence during the late 1960s and early 1970s).
74. Christine Bell, Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1095, 1097 & n.9 (2003) (citing JOHN McGARRY & BRENDAN O'L0ARY, THE POLITCS OF
ANTAGONISM: UNDERSTANDING NORTHERN IRELAND 11-12 (2d ed. 1996)).
75. See McKiTrRICK & McVEA, supra note 68, at 98-117, 149-66 (discussing the
failure of these two initiatives to end the Troubles).
76. See id. at 184-213.
77. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, U.K.-Ir., Apr. 10, 1998, 37
I.L.M. 751 [hereinafter Good Friday Agreement].
78. Colm Campbell & Fionnuala Ni Aoldin, Local Meets Global: Transitional Justice in
Northern Ireland, 26 FoRDHAm INT'L J. 871, 886 (2003).
79. See Timeline: Northern Ireland Assembly, BBC NEws, Dec. 8, 2004, http://
newswww.bbc.net.uk/1/hi/northern ireland/2952997.stm.
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paramilitary groups are expected to disarm and ultimately disband-has
been particularly problematic.8 0 So too have issues relating to the reform
of Northern Ireland's policing system 8 ' and the "early release" of paramili-
tary prisoners.8 2 As a result of these and other difficulties, overall support
for the Good Friday Agreement has declined. This is evidenced by a trend
towards political polarization. In Northern Ireland's 2003 local elections,
IRA-allied Sinn Fein and the anti-Agreement Democratic Unionist Party
(DUP) won the largest numbers of Catholic and Protestant votes, respec-
tively, raising fears that the entire peace process might collapse.8 3 The May
2005 national elections produced similar results: the DUP and Sinn Fein
won a combined fourteen of Northern Ireland's eighteen seats at Westmin-
ster, further damaging prospects for cooperation and power-sharing at the
local level. 84
80. For a valuable overview of the highly complex problem of decommissioning, see
Kieran McEvoy & John Morison, Beyond the 'Constitutional Moment': Law, Transition, and
Peacemaking in Northern Ireland, 26 FoRDHM INT'L LJ. 961, 982 & n.72 (2003), and
RICHARD ENGLISH, ARMED STRUGGLE: THE HISTORY OF THE IRA 325-36 (2003), which dis-
cusses the heated debate over the decommissioning of the IRA.
81. Throughout Northern Ireland's history, the RUC was viewed by Nationalists as a
pro-Unionist, anti-Catholic force. See GRAHAM ELLISON &JIM SMYTH, THE CROWNED HARP:
POLICING NORTHERN IRELAND 150-76 (2000). The Patten Commission was established in
order to recommend policing reforms, and its findings resulted in the creation of the
new Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). See INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON POLIC-
ING FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, A NEW BEGINNING: POLICING IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1999),
available at http://www.belfast.org.uk/report/fullreport.pdf [hereinafter PATTEN
REPORT]. For critique of the reforms, see Linda Moore, Policing and Change in Northern
Ireland: The Centrality of Human Rights, 22 FoRDA INT'L LJ. 1577 (1999), which
asserts that international principles of human rights must form the basis of police
reform in Northern Ireland, and Mary O'Rawe, Transitional Policing Arrangements in
Northern Ireland: The Can't and the Won't of the Change Dialectic, 26 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J.
1015 (2003), which argues that the changes implemented as the result of the Patten
Report fall short of what was required in light of past abuses, thereby hindering the
peace process.
82. The Good Friday Agreement provided for the release of paramilitary prisoners
belonging to those organizations that maintained "complete and unequivocal" ceasefires.
Good Friday Agreement, supra note 77, § 10. This provision was one of the Agreement's
most controversial aspects. See generally Kieran McEvoy, The Prisoners, The Agreement,
and the Political Character of the Northern Ireland Conflict, 22 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. 1539
(1999) (contending that the early release provision was essential in order to ensure that
the paramilitaries and their political allies consented to the Agreement); Daniel F. Mulvi-
hill, Note, The Legality of the Pardoning of Paramilitaries Under the Early Release Provi-
sions of Northern Ireland's Good Friday Agreement, 34 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 227 (2001)
(arguing that the early release of paramilitary prisoners was both problematic under
international law and imprudent given the fragile nature of Northern Ireland's peace
process).
83. See, e.g., Gerry Moriarty, Political Geography of the North is Being Changed as
Never Before, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 27, 2003, available at http://www.ireland.com/focus/
nielection/comment/2711.htm (predicting that, as a result of the 2003 election results,
"[tihere is a great danger that politics will remain stalled for some time to come").
84. For comprehensive information on the 2005 elections, see Election '05: Northern
Ireland, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, May 9, 2005, available at http://www.belfasttelegraph.
co.uk/html/election05/index.htm. See also DUP Issues Warning at Westminster, BBC
NEWS, May 11, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northernireland/4535503.stm (quot-
ing DUP leader Ian Paisley as saying that the election results spelled the end for the "so-
called [Good Friday] agreement").
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Why is the Good Friday Agreement at risk? One explanation is that
thus far, the peace process has failed to address the legacies of conflict.
Northern Ireland has yet to establish "truth" in the form of a broadly-
acceptable narrative of the Troubles upon which peace and reconciliation
may be built. Three aspects of Northern Ireland's unique transition illumi-
nate the need for some form of official truth-seeking as part of the peace
process, at the same time as they demonstrate the significant obstacles
such truth-seeking would face: the nature of the Good Friday Agreement
itself; Northern Ireland's complex relationship with the British state; and
the role of non-state actors (i.e. the paramilitaries) in perpetrating past vio-
lence and disrupting the current peace.
A. The Good Friday Agreement
In a sense, the Good Friday Agreement "is aimed at 'dealing with the
past.'" 8 5 Each dimension of the Agreement's three-tiered structure can be
explained by reference to the basic political difference at the heart of the
Troubles: the Unionist desire to remain within the UK and the Nationalist
goal of integration with the Republic. 86 In theory, this is a sound response
to the conflict. In practice, however, it allows both sides to perpetuate
political antagonism. The Agreement "was sold to different people on very
different terms. Republicans saw it as transitional to a united Ireland,
unionist supporters as a barrier precisely against such a development.
87
As a result, there is a lack of agreement on what the Agreement is all about,
and little movement from the basic political stances that existed prior to
1998.
This is due to the failure of the Good Friday Agreement to explore
fully the roots of the Troubles. Conspicuously absent from the Agreement
is the establishment of a "'past-specific mechanism' addressed at accounta-
bility or truth-telling."8 8 Instead, the Agreement relies upon "the ad hoc
'pragmatic' confidence-building approach . . . rather than offering a more
comprehensive approach to the past."8 9 In essence, the Good Friday
Agreement provides political compromise in a structural sense, but leaves
important questions unanswered. What was the conflict about-was it
fueled by partition and the inherent inequalities of the Northern Irish
state, 90 or by IRA terrorism?9 1 Who are the victims? In Northern Ireland,
as in other divided societies such as the Middle East or the Balkans, each
85. Bell, supra note 74, at 1106.
86. Id.
87. ENGLISH, supra note 80, at 298-99.
88. Bell, supra note 74, at 1106.
89. Id.
90. This is the view taken by Republicans. See generally GERRY ADAMs, FREE IRELAND:
TOWARDS A LASTING PEACE (2d ed. 1994). "The very existence of the conflict shows that
the undemocratic political structures imposed on the Irish people by Britain in 1921,
and maintained today, have failed and are a continuing source of division and instabil-
ity." Id. at 169.
91. See BRUCE, supra note 70, at 6-10 (presenting the oft-advanced Loyalist argument
that their violence developed only in response to the IRA's terror campaign).
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community "considers itself a historical victim and is unwilling to
acknowledge that its community has also oppressed or excluded others."
9 2
What actions were justified? For example, the IRA has admitted to carry-
ing out many of its atrocities, but largely insists that these were justifiable
responses to the violence and repression of British and Unionist rule.
93
These questions all help to identify the big question left unanswered by the
Good Friday Agreement: how should the people of Northern Ireland deal
with their past, learn from it, and move on?
B. The British State
The role of the British state in Northern Ireland adds a unique dimen-
sion to the transitional process. Unlike other post-conflict societies, North-
ern Ireland functions as a subordinate polity of an advanced Western state
with a formal commitment to liberal democracy. 94 Britain both is and is
not part of the transition: it maintains ultimate political control over North-
ern Ireland and plays a leading role in shaping the transitional process, yet
its government, institutions, and citizens are largely unaffected by the
changes that occur.
The impact of the British connection plays out in two important ways.
The first relates to issues of justice and the role of criminal prosecutions.
The rule of law never applied to Northern Ireland in the same way as it did
to other parts of the UK. Britain turned a blind eye towards the discrimina-
tory practices of Northern Ireland's Unionist government between 1921
and 1969, and after the outbreak of the Troubles it implemented practices
of prolonged internment and secret, non-jury "Diplock Courts" that were
employed liberally, especially against the Catholic community. 95 These
and other abusive tactics were justified by emergency legislation that
applied specifically to Northern Ireland.9 6 Methods of interrogation
amounting to "inhuman or degrading treatment" were used against
paramilitary suspects.9 7 In the mid-1980s, the Stalker Investigation into
92. TRUTH COMMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT, supra note 17, at 32 (describing
prevalent sentiments of communal victimization in the former Yugoslavia).
93. See id. at 74-75.
94. Campbell & Ni Aolain, supra note 78, at 872.
95. See generally KEVIN BOYLE ET AL., LAW AND STATE: THE CASE OF NORTHERN IRELAND
(1975) (describing the British government's ambivalence towards Unionist discrimina-
tion, as well as its practices of arrest, internment, and prosecution during the early years
of the Troubles).
96. See DERMOT PJ. WALSH, THE USE AND ABUSE OF EMERGENCY LEGISLATION IN NORTH-
ERN IRELAND (1983) (providing an overview of British legislative responses to the Trou-
bles). See also GERARD HOGAN & CLIVE WALKER, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE LAW IN
IRELAND 27-174 (1989) (concentrating on emergency legislation introduced in Northern
Ireland since 1972); and Laura K. Donohue, Civil Liberties, Terrorism, and Liberal
Democracy: Lessons from the United Kingdom (Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Working Paper No.
ESDP-2000-01, 2000) (identifying Northern Ireland's extensive emergency legislation as
the blueprint for recent, UK-wide anti-terrorism provisions).
97. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25, 58-62, 79-81 (1978) (hold-
ing that the "five techniques" employed during interrogations in Northern Ireland-forc-
ing detainees to remain in "stress positions" for long periods of time, putting bags on
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the actions of the RUC and British Army allegedly uncovered the existence
of a "shoot-to-kill" policy in regard to members of the IRA. 98
Yet despite its deficiencies (and unlike the judicial systems in many
other post-conflict societies), Northern Ireland's courts, and the British
judicial system in general, "worked" throughout the Troubles in the sense
that they produced convictions of criminal offenders-especially those
involved in paramilitary violence. 99 While some of these convictions were
undoubtedly false, 100 and while in many cases the methods used in
obtaining conviction were questionable, it is undeniable that a good num-
ber of perpetrators were rightly prosecuted and convicted. 10 1 These prose-
cutions, combined with the tendency of paramilitary groups to claim
public responsibility for their violent acts, means that the threshold ques-
tion of "who did what to whom?" has in many instances been answered in
Northern Ireland. 10 2 This, in turn, allows Britain to contend that the jus-
tice system was basically effective, and to shy away from directly con-
fronting its failures.
The extent to which Britain will continue to seek prosecutions in
Northern Ireland remains to be seen. The ability to try, convict, and pun-
ish offenders is one of the cornerstones of state sovereignty and authority,
yet Britain's current approach to the use of criminal prosecutions for vio-
lence committed during the Troubles appears somewhat contradictory. On
the one hand, in January 2006, the Police Service of Northern Ireland
(PSNI) established a Historical Enquiries Team (HET) charged with investi-
gating a total of 3,268 deaths that took place between 1968 and the signing
of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.103 According to Peter Hain, Brit-
ain's Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, it is "quite possible" that per-
detainees heads, exposing detainees to continuous white noise, depriving detainees of
sleep, and depriving detainees of food and drink-constituted "inhuman or degrading
treatment" under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights).
98. See ELLISON & SMYTH, supra note 81, at 116-33. Obstruction on the part of the
British government and RUC ultimately prevented the investigation's findings from
being published. See generally JOHN STALKER, THE STALKER AFFAIR (1988) (providing a
firsthand account of the investigation and subsequent cover-up).
99. See WALSH, supra note 96, at 79-106 (providing a thorough, albeit highly critical,
examination of the court system in Northern Ireland during the early years of the
Troubles).
100. The most widely-known failures of British justice in relation to Northern Ireland
were the convictions of the "Guildford Four" and "Birmingham Six," Irish men and
women who were wrongfully convicted of bombing pubs in England in the 1970s.
These convictions were overturned in 1989 and 1991, respectively-but not before those
accused had served lengthy prison sentences. See ENGLISH, supra note 80, at 167-71.
101. According to official RUC statistics, 955 of the 2,788 murders committed
between 1969 and 1998 resulted in someone being charged. Bell, supra note 74, at
1128.
102. See TRUTH COMMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT, supra note 17, at 68 ("The
vast majority of deaths by paramilitaries in Northern Ireland have been acknowledged,
and many of them have been investigated and have led to prosecutions in the courts.").
103. See Press Release, Police Service of Northern Ireland, New Police Historical
Enquiries Team (Jan. 20, 2006), available at http://www.psni.police.uk/index/
media_centre/press releases/pgpress releases_2006/pr_.2006january/pr-police-his-
torical-enquiries-team.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2006).
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petrators will face prison sentences as a result of the HET's work.10 4 On
the other hand, the now-discredited Northern Ireland (Offences) Bill'I 0
casts doubt on Britain's commitment to pursuing an aggressive
prosecutorial response to past crimes. The Bill, designed to apply to "on-
the-runs" (fugitive paramilitaries wanted in connection with violent crimes
that occurred during the Troubles) as well as certain state actors involved
in lethal force deaths, envisioned a process by which these offenders would
face criminal convictions before a special tribunal, but would be freed on
license without serving prison sentences. 10 6 The Bill was withdrawn in
January 2006 amidst fierce criticism from all shades of Northern Irish
political opinion that the plan amounted to an unwarranted amnesty for
certain categories of offenders. 10 7
What role should criminal prosecutions play in Northern Ireland's
transition? Future criminal trials need not be a detriment to the peace pro-
cess insofar as they can make positive contributions to the need for truth
and justice.' 0l 8 Nonetheless, it is also important to recognize that in North-
ern Ireland past perversions of justice have created hostility towards the
judicial system. This is particularly apparent in the Nationalist commu-
nity, where the experiences of arrest, internment, and prosecution are
viewed as badges of honor rather than marks of shame. '0 9 Mistrust of the
British legal system among certain segments of Northern Irish society
undermines its effectiveness in aiding the transitional process.
The second way in which the British connection impacts the process
of transition in Northern Ireland relates to incidents of violence for which
British state actors are directly responsible. Officially, the British Army
and security forces caused over 350 deaths in Northern Ireland-roughly
ten percent of the total number of those killed during the Troubles."l 0 This
figure includes incidents such as Bloody Sunday, in which it is widely
believed that British paratroopers were responsible for the deaths of four-
teen unarmed Catholic civil rights marchers. 1 Moreover, the British state
has also been implicated in a number of other murders through collusion
with Loyalist paramilitaries.11 2 Rather than accept responsibility for these
104. Murder Review Team to Begin Work, BBC NEws, Jan. 23, 2006, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/northern ireland/4636634stm.
105. Northern Ireland (Offences) Bill, 2005, available at http://www.nio.gov.uk/
northern_irelandoffencesbill.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2006) (withdrawn on January
10, 2006).
106. Id.
107. See Government Scraps Fugitive Plans, BBC NEWS, Jan. 11, 2006, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/northern ireland/4602314.stm.
108. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., CorNRoY, supra note 68, at 8-9 (describing the lack of stigma attached to
arrest and incarceration in Nationalist communities).
110. See Bell, supra note 74, at 1127.
111. See infra Part III.C.
112. See ELLISON & SMYTH, supra note 81, at 134-49; see also infra Part III.B. See
generally MARTIN DILLON, THE DIRTY WAR (1988) (detailing the often murky role played
by the British intelligence services in perpetuating the Troubles); SEAN MCPHILEMY, THE
COMMITTEE: POLITICAL ASSASSINATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1998) (alleging widespread
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deaths, Britain has generally "concealed and distorted" the role of state
actors in the conflict. 1 13
Thus, for the goals of truth and justice to be achieved in Northern
Ireland, the role of British state actors in perpetuating the conflict must be
acknowledged. This is easier said than done. Britain has shown little incli-
nation to allow its military and security personnel to face sanctions for
offenses carried out in Northern Ireland. 114 In many cases, the British
state has ignored or actively covered up the role of state agents in past
violence. 115 Britain's attitudes towards past state violence are predictable,
and difficult to remedy, given that the transition in Northern Ireland does
not go to the heart of the British state. Britain has little reason or incentive
for exposing its institutions and individual actors to processes of accounta-
bility, and to the extent that groups in Northern Ireland desire such
accountability, they do not enjoy the overall political leverage necessary to
compel it.
C. The Paramilitaries
To an appreciable extent, notions of transitional justice assume state
responsibility for the majority of past abuses. 116 This was true in places
such as Argentina, Chile, and South Africa. It was not the case in Northern
Ireland, where non-state paramilitary organizations were responsible for
the vast majority of deaths during the Troubles. 1 17 As previously noted,
the extent of paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland has been docu-
mented to some degree by means of public admissions and criminal prose-
cutions. 1 18 Furthermore, as the early release provisions of the Good
Friday Agreement 1 9 and proposals for decommissioning 120 indicate,
attention was paid to the paramilitary dimension of the conflict in con-
structing the framework for peace.
Nonetheless, important issues surrounding paramilitary violence
remain unsolved. First, on the Loyalist side, there is the issue of collabora-
tion with the British state in carrying out acts of violence. 12 1 Second, for
all paramilitary groups, but especially the IRA, the issue of justification
collaboration between Unionist politicians, Loyalist paramilitaries, and British state
agents in the murder of Nationalists).
113. TRUTH COMMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT, supra note 17, at 70; see also id.
at 68 ("The deaths which are denied are largely, if not solely, those which took place at
the hands of government agents.").
114. Between 1974 and 1994, thirty-four state agents were prosecuted for the use of
force while on duty, leading to just eight convictions. FIONNUALA Ni AOLAIN, THE POLIT-
ICS OF FORCE: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND STATE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND 73
(2000).
115. See infra Parts III.B & III.C.
116. See, e.g., TEITEL, supra note 8, at 27 ("In the public imagination, transitional jus-
tice is commonly linked with punishment and the trials of ancien regimes.").
117. See Bell, supra note 74, at 1127.
118. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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remains unresolved by the current peace process. Despite its cessation of
hostilities and recent decommissioning of weapons, the IRA believes that
its armed struggle was justifiable. 12 2 Here, a comparison with the African
National Congress (ANC) during the South African transition is useful.
Like the IRA, the ANC believed that its past actions were justified; unlike
the IRA, however, it found itself on the cusp of a legitimate political victory
that confirmed this perception. As a result, the ANC was willing to
undergo internal scrutiny in the form of two self-implemented truth com-
missions that investigated abuses among its activists.1 23 These commis-
sions were important in shaping the future TRC process. 124 In contrast,
the Good Friday Agreement cannot necessarily be viewed as a victory for
the IRA because it falls far short of the organization's long-held goal of a
united Ireland. This has caused significant tension within the IRA between
activists who support the Agreement and those who oppose it, and goes a
long way towards explaining the difficulties that were faced in the process
of decommissioning: IRA activists who believed their campaign was not
complete were reluctant to hand over their weapons-an act viewed as tan-
tamount to admitting defeat.125
Third, paramilitary "punishment violence" presents unique problems
for Northern Ireland's peace process. During the Troubles, in areas where
paramilitary activity was strong, such organizations often became a law
unto themselves, replacing state authorities as dispensers of "justice":
The Northern Ireland conflict produced a brutal system of informal justice
wherein both Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries assumed responsibility
for the 'policing' of their areas through punishment beatings, shootings, and
banishments. Thousands of individuals were shot in the knees, thighs,
elbows or ankles, beaten with iron bars, baseball bats or hurling sticks, or
forcibly excluded from their communities. 1 26
How should the peace process draw the line between politically-motivated
violence and sheer criminality in relation to such incidents? One argument
is that punishment violence represents an essentially criminal form of
repression designed to maintain paramilitary hegemony within local com-
munities. 12 7 Another argument, however, is that punishment violence was
the inevitable result of the lack of legitimacy of the RUC and British Army
122. See supra notes 90, 93; see also ENGLISH, supra note 80, at 288 (noting that, in
deciding to call its 1994 ceasefire and enter tentatively into the peace process, the IRA
remained convinced that the conflict stemmed from "British policy and ... unionist
intransigence" rather than its own campaign of violence).
123. See IAYNER, supra note 9, at 60-61, 62-64 (describing the ANC's two internal
truth commissions, and their influence on the work of the TRC).
124. See id. at 64 (noting that the success of its two internal truth commissions
prompted the ANC to call for the creation of a truth commission for South Africa as a
whole).
125. See ENGLISH, supra note 80, at 303-36 (examining the post-Agreement rift within
the IRA and its impact on the process of decommissioning).
126. Kieran McEvoy & Henry Mika, Restorative Justice and the Critique of Informalism
in Northern Ireland, 42 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 534, 536 (2002) (citation omitted).
127. Id. See generally MALACHI O'DOHERTY, THE TROUBLE WITH GUNS: REPUBLICAN
STRATEGY AND THE PROVISIONAL IRA (1998); Liam Kennedy, Nightmares within Night-
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in certain (often Nationalist) areas-in other words, an outgrowth of North-
ern Ireland's political conflict.128
Regardless of how punishment violence is viewed, the murder of Rob-
ert McCartney by members of the IRA in January 2005 demonstrates the
extent to which paramilitary authority is often used to cover up or justify
essentially criminal acts. Following a dispute in a bar, McCartney, who
had no connection to either the IRA or its enemies, was dragged into the
street and stabbed to death. 129 Witnesses to the murder were told by those
responsible that the killing was an "internal I.R.A. matter," and were
threatened with vengeance if they cooperated with the police investiga-
tion.130 Subsequently, McCartney's sisters embarked on a campaign to
uncover the truth about their brother's murder, prompting similar calls for
justice from the families of other victims.' 3 ' Faced with substantial public
outrage, the IRA's initial response was to suggest an eye for an eye-it
offered to shoot those responsible for the attack. 132 Such a suggestion
would be laughable did it not indicate the substantial capacity for extra-
legal violence on the part of the paramilitary organizations that still hold
sway in many parts of Northern Ireland.
III. Recent Attempts at Official Truth-Seeking in Northern Ireland
The history of the Troubles and the unique contours of the current
peace process suggest that some form of official truth-seeking could help
foster peace and stability in Northern Ireland, even as they make the pro-
cess of truth-seeking notably difficult. It is important to recognize, how-
ever, that issues of truth, justice, and accountability have not been left
entirely untouched by the transitional process. A discussion of recent
efforts at official truth-seeking is essential for understanding how a truth
commission might function in Northern Ireland.
A. "We Will Remember Them": Report of the Northern Ireland Victims'
Commissioner
In October 1997, the British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
appointed Sir Kenneth Bloomfield as Northern Ireland Victims' Commis-
sioner, and charged him with looking "at possible ways to recognize the
pain and suffering felt by victims of violence arising from the troubles of
mares: Paramilitary Repression in Working Class Communities, in CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
IN WEST BELFAST (Liam Kennedy ed., 1995).
128. See McEvoy & Mika, supra note 126, at 536 (explaining that the lack of effective
state authority in Nationalist areas created a need for paramilitary enforcement of socie-
tal norms, and that such enforcement was often popular among residents of the areas in
which it occurred).
129. See Lizette Alvarez, Killing in Belfast Puts I.R.A. on the Defensive, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
7, 2005, at A6.
130. Id.
131. Brian Lavery, Families in Northern Ireland Break Silence About Killings, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2005, at A5.
132. See Alan Cowell, I.R.A. Avowal on a Killing Ignites a Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,
2005, at A8.
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the last 30 years, including those who have died or been injured in the
service of the community."'1 3 3 Bloomfield released his report in April
1998, just weeks after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement.
In some respects, the Bloomfield Report represents a noble attempt to
acknowledge and pay tribute to the innocent victims of the Troubles. The
commission interviewed hundreds of victims and victims' families, 13 4 and
the report made at least a cursory attempt at quantifying the scale of inju-
ries and wider effects of violence. 135 The Bloomfield Report offered a
number of broad recommendations, including providing financial and
medical assistance services to victims, 13 6 building a physical memorial,
137
and creating a new "Memorial and Reconciliation" holiday. 138
The report acknowledged the "firm view [of many victims] that all
questions of memorialisation or compensation were secondary in their
minds to the establishment of the full truth,"13 9 and stated that many vic-
tims "argued strongly for the establishment of a Northern Ireland
equivalent of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission."'140
Nonetheless, the report did not explicitly recommend the establishment of
a truth commission. Instead, it suggested that such a commission could
only be created as part of an overall political settlement: "If any such device
were to have a place in the life of Northern Ireland, it could only be in the
context of a wide-ranging political accord."'14 1
The Bloomfield Report has been criticized as a failure of official truth-
seeking insofar as it reinforces notions of a "hierarchy of victims":
In terms of the issue of victims' rights in Northern Ireland, it may be useful
to note that there is, as in many countries, an ongoing battle over degrees of
suffering. That is, many victims' groups qualify their victimhood. It has
become common for some groups to refer to themselves as "real" or "inno-
cent" victims. Such qualifications indirectly imply, whether purposefully or
not, that there must be "guilty" victims .... The phrase "hierarchy of vic-
tims" has become commonplace. 14 2
The Bloomfield Report devotes only two paragraphs in its sixty pages to
victims killed by state actors, 143 and makes no recommendations as to how
the gap in accountability for state-sponsored violence should be addressed.
Conversely, in keeping with the Victims' Commissioner's mandate to rec-
ognize those who died "in the service of the community,"' 4 4 the report
133. SIR KENNETH BLOOMFIELD, WE WILL REMEMBER THEM: REPORT OF THE NORTHERN
h IAND VICTMS' COMMISSIONER 8 (1998), available at http://www.nio.gov.uk/bloom-
field.pdf [hereinafter BLOOMFIELD REPORT].
134. Id. at 16-18.
135. Id. at 11-14.
136. Id. at 26-39.
137. Id. at 45-49.
138. Id. at 43-44.
139. Id. at 36.
140. Id. at 37.
141. Id. at 38.
142. Hamber, supra note 24, at 1090.
143. See BLOOMFIELD REPORT, supra note 133, at 36.
144. Id. at 8; see also supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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explicitly affirms the "innocence" of policemen, soldiers, employees of the
prison service, and other state agents who died in the conflict.1 45 This
categorization would undoubtedly be contested by many Nationalists and
Republicans, who would view such state agents as no more (and quite pos-
sibly less) "innocent" than, for example, the three unarmed IRA activists
shot dead by members of the British Army's Special Air Service (SAS) in
Gibraltar in 1988.146 In other words, while acknowledging "the many 'lit-
tle people' caught up in violence," 14 7 the Bloomfield Report fails to ade-
quately address the full spectrum of victimization resulting from the
Troubles.
The British government's appointment of Bertha McDougall as Interim
Commissioner for Victims and Survivors of the Troubles in October
2005148 has placed the debate over the "hierarchy of victims" back on
Northern Ireland's political agenda. McDougall is herself a victim of the
Troubles: her husband, an RUC reservist, was killed by a Republican
paramilitary splinter group, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), in
1981. Critics of the appointment contend that McDougall, like Bloomfield,
will be predisposed to viewing certain victims of the Troubles, in particular
state actors killed by paramilitaries, as more "innocent" than other victims,
specifically members of paramilitary organizations killed by agents of the
state. 149
B. Article 2 Decisions by the European Court of Human Rights
Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights establishes a
"right to life":
1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be
deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a
court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is pro-
vided by law.
2. Deprivation shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this
article when it results from the use of force which is no more than abso-
lutely necessary:
a. in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
b. in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person
lawfully detained;
145. BLOOMFIELD REPORT, supra note 133, at 30.
146. In 1988, three unarmed IRA activists who had intended to set off a car bomb
during a changing-of-the-guard ceremony in Gibraltar were shot and killed by the SAS.
Later, the European Court of Human Rights determined that this constituted an unlaw-
ful use of lethal force insofar as the three suspects could easily have been arrested rather
than killed. McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995).
147. BLOOMFIELD REPORT, supra note 133, at 30.
148. See Press Release, Northern Ireland Office, Peter Hain Announces Interim Com-
missioner for Victims (Oct. 24, 2005), http://www.nio.gov.uk/media-detail.htm?news
ID=12419.
149. See Mark Devenport, What Defines a Victim in NI?, BBC NEws, Oct. 26, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern-ireland/4375816.stm.
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c. in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or
insurrection. 1
50
On May 4, 2001, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
decided four cases (known collectively as Jordan et al.) in which it held that
the UK violated Article 2 by failing to carry out effective official investiga-
tions into fourteen deaths in Northern Ireland allegedly caused by the
security forces. 15 1 Subsequently, the ECHR handed down similar deci-
sions in McShane v. United Kingdom 152 and Finucane v. United Kingdom.
15 3
Taken together, these cases expand the ECHR's previous Article 2 jurispru-
dence by more clearly defining the procedural component of the right to
life. According to the ECHR, in order to qualify as an effective official
investigation, the state's response to lethal force deaths caused by state
actors must be (1) prompt; (2) independent, meaning that the investigators
must be institutionally and hierarchically separate from the state institu-
tion (e.g. the military or police) accused of causing the death; (3) effective,
in the sense of producing evidence that can lead to prosecutions of respon-
sible individuals where this is warranted; and (4) transparent, both to the
public at large as well as to the family members of the victim.
1 5 4
Of the incidents prompting Article 2 cases before the ECHR, the mur-
der of Patrick Finucane is perhaps the most widely-discussed and contro-
versial. Finucane, a defense lawyer, was well-known in Northern Ireland
for defending IRA suspects, and was a frequent target of death threats and
other forms of intimidation. 1 5 5 In January 1989, several of Finucane's cli-
ents who had been held at Castlereagh interrogation center near Belfast
reported that their interrogators had warned that Finucane would soon
"meet his end." 15 6 On February 12, 1989, Finucane was murdered in front
of his family in his Belfast home. The Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), a
branch of the Loyalist UDA paramilitary group, claimed responsibility for
the assassination. 1 57
150. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms art. 2,, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
151. McKerr v. United Kingdom, 2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 475. Relevant excerpts of the
other three cases are available in the appendix to McKerr, 2001-111 Eur. Ct. Hr. H.R. at
537, and are also available in full on the ECHR's website. European Court of Human
Rights, http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2006) (select "case-law"
hyperlink; then follow "HUDOC" hyperlink; then enter applicant number of the follow-
ing cases and click "Search"). Jordan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24746/94, Judgment,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (May 4, 2001); Kelly et al. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 30054/96, Judg-
ment, Eur. Ct. H.R. (May 4, 2001); Shanaghan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 37715/97,
Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. (May 4, 2001).
152. McShane v. United Kingdom, App. No. 43290/98, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. (May
28, 2002), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/.
153. Finucane v. United Kingdom, 2003-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
154. For a useful summary of the components of an effective official investigation as
established in the Jordan et al. decisions, see Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Truth Telling, Account-
ability, and the Right to Life in Northern Ireland, 5 EUR. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 571, 580-81
(2002).
155. Finucane, 2003-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 8.
156. id.
157. Id.
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From the outset, the investigation into Finucane's death revealed the
possibility that the RUC and British military intelligence either knew
about, or were active participants in, the murder. A UDA member was
found in possession of the gun used to kill Finucane, and during his subse-
quent interrogation he claimed to have acted as an RUC Special Branch
informant for three years. 158 In 1990, a report by the Stevens Inquiry,
established by the British government to investigate allegations of collusion
between the security forces and Loyalist paramilitaries, led to the arrest of
Brian Nelson. 15 9 Nelson, the UDA's chief intelligence officer and a pri-
mary planner of the Finucane assassination, worked as a double agent pro-
viding information to British military intelligence. 1 60 Nelson claimed that
prior to Finucane's murder he had alerted his British handlers of the plot.
Rather than attempt to protect Finucane, however, his superiors instead
provided him with information on the lawyer which he then passed along
to the UDA.161 Nonetheless, despite this significant evidence of state
involvement in, or knowledge of, the plot to murder Finucane, the Depart-
ment of Public Prosecutions (DPP) determined that there was insufficient
evidence to warrant its involvement in the matter.16 2
in keeping with the procedural right to life jurisprudence established
in the Jordan et al. decisions, the ECHR did not make a determination as to
whether or not state agents were actually responsible for Finucane's death.
Instead, the Court found a violation of Article 2 based on the UK's failure
to conduct an effective official investigation into the murder. 16 3 The Court
also criticized the government for its failure to fully explore allegations of
collusion, and to carry out the prosecution of suspects against whom it had
uncovered evidence. 164
The ECHR's Article 2 decisions have prompted a limited response by
the state. A British government inquiry under the leadership of John Ste-
vens, the same senior British police officer who had chaired earlier investi-
gations into allegations of collusion, recommended further investigation
into Finucane's death. 165 The Stevens Inquiry stated that there was ample
evidence of security force collusion in the murders of Finucane and others,
and asserted that as a result of this collusion "innocent people were mur-
158. Id. at 9.
159. Id. at 11.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 12.
163. Id, at 27. The Court found:
The proceedings following the death of Patrick Finucane failed to provide a
prompt and effective investigation into the allegations of collusion by security
personnel. There has consequently been a failure to comply with the procedural
obligation imposed by Article 2 of the Convention and there has been, in this
respect, a violation of that provision.
Id.
164. See id. at 26-27.
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dered or seriously injured.1 6 6 In terms of practical changes to the ways in
which investigations into allegations of state violence are carried out, the
British government has changed Northern Ireland's rules of criminal pro-
cedure so as to allow the state to compel witnesses to provide information
regarding state violence to coroner's inquests.16 7 The Police Ombudsman
for Northern Ireland, established following the Good Friday Agreement, is
charged with carrying out independent investigations into complaints
against the PSNI. 168 Shortly before the Finucane decision was handed
down, the Police Ombudsman released a report examining the relationship
between the security forces and Northern Ireland's legal community, and
considering ways in which this relationship might be improved. 16 9
The ECHR's findings of violations of Article 2 in relation to state vio-
lence in Northern Ireland have therefore prompted some truth-seeking
responses by the British government. But how far will such responses actu-
ally go in establishing the truth and requiring accountability? Attempts to
comply with Article 2 face the reluctance on the part of the British govern-
ment to be held accountable for its actions in Northern Ireland. Recent
reports from the Council of Europe express significant concern over the
extent to which the UK's reforms in Northern Ireland have satisfied the
state's obligations under Article 2 in light of the ECHR decisions. 170
Meanwhile, the murder of Patrick Finucane remains a point of contention
between the British state, Nationalists, and Unionists, all of whom dispute
the circumstances in which the killing took place and reject the Stevens
Inquiry's findings on various grounds. 17 1
C. The Bloody Sunday Inquiry
OnJanuary 30, 1972, British paratroopers opened fire on a civil rights
march in Derry, killing fourteen civilians in an incident that became
166. See Stevens Statement: Key Extracts, BBC NEws, Apr. 17, 2003, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/northern_ireland/2956557.stm.
167. See MARK KELLY, NORTHERN IRELAND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, THE RIGHT TO
LIFE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 22 (2005),
available at http://www.nihrc.org/documents/pubs/rights/TheRighttoLife.pdf.
168. Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, http://www.policeombudsman.org
(last visited Feb. 11, 2006).
169. RESEARCH BRANCH, POLICE OMBUDSMAN FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, A STUDY OF THE
TREATMENT OF SOLICITORS AND BARRISTERS BY THE POLICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND (2003),
available at http://www.policeombudsman.org/Publicationsuploads/solresearch.pdf.
170. Council of Europe, Report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human
Rights, on his Visit to the United Kingdom, 9 156-185 (June 8, 2005), available at http://
www.statewatch.org/news/2005/jun/coe-uk-report.pdf; Council of Europe, Committee
of Ministers, Action of the Security Forces in Northern Ireland: Measures taken or envisaged
to ensure compliance with the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases
against the United Kingdom listed in Appendix III, Interim Resolution ResDH(2005)20, 40
E.H.R.R. SE26 (Feb. 23, 2005).
171. Kevin Connolly, Stevens Inquiry Exposes NI Divisions, BBC NEWs, Apr. 17, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern-ireland/2957445.stm.
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known as Bloody Sunday. 172 Bloody Sunday remains the largest single
instance of the killing of civilians by the security forces in Northern Ire-
land. 173 In many respects, it was and remains a watershed moment in the
history of the Troubles. Bloody Sunday sparked a surge of Nationalist vio-
lence, and greatly increased recruitment for the IRA. 174 It alienated the
British Army from the Nationalist community and severely damaged
notions of the rule of law in Northern Ireland. 1 75 Bloody Sunday also
played a major role in the British government's decision to prorogue North-
ern Ireland's Unionist-dominated local parliament and implement direct
rule of the province from London in March 1972.176
The Widgery Tribunal, convened in the wake of Bloody Sunday, only
added to the anger and controversy surrounding the event. The tribunal
absolved the paratroopers of any wrongdoing, and suggested that the dem-
onstrators who were killed had posed a threat to safety and security. 17 7
From the outset, these findings were rejected by the Nationalist commu-
nity, which viewed them as a whitewash by the British government and
further proof of Britain's unwillingness to uphold the rule of law in North-
ern Ireland. 178 In the years following Bloody Sunday, further investiga-
tions into the day's events revealed overwhelming evidence that the
fourteen dead marchers were innocent of all wrongdoing (at the most,
some of them might have engaged in stone-throwing), and that the actions
taken by the paratroopers in confronting the Derry civil rights march
amounted to a massacre of innocent civilians. 179
On January 29, 1998, Prime Minister Tony Blair called for the estab-
lishment of a second Bloody Sunday Inquiry in order to reexamine the
incident. 180 The Inquiry began its work in 1998 and is expected to release
its report in 2006.181 To date, it is the largest and most expensive public
inquiry in UK history. 18 2
172. For an overview of the events of Bloody Sunday, see Angela Hegarty, The Govern-
ment of Memory: Public Inquiries and the Limits of Justice in Northern Ireland, 26 FORD,
HAM INT'L LJ. 1148, 1162-65 (2003).
173. Bell, supra note 74, at 1103-04.
174. See ENGLISH, supra note 80, at 150-52.
175. Hegarty, supra note 172, at 1164-65.
176. See id. at 1165.
177. See TRIBUNAL UNDER THE TRIBUNALS OF INQUIRY (EVIDENCE) ACT 1921, INQUIRY
INTO THE EVENTS ON 30 JANUARY 1972 WHICH LED TO Loss OF LIFE IN CONNECTION WITH
THE PROCESSION IN LONDONDERRY ON THAT DAY, 1972, H.L. 101, H.C. 220.
178. See Hegarty, supra note 172, at 1165-68.
179. See generally DON MULLAN, BLOODY SUNDAY: MASSACRE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
(1997) (providing eyewitness accounts of the incident indicating that the actions of the
British soldiers were not provoked by violence on the part of the victims).
180. See Tony Blair, Prime Minister, Statement to the House of Commons (Jan. 29,
1998), available at The Bloody Sunday Inquiry, http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org
(last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
181. See The Bloody Sunday Inquiry, Frequently Asked Questions, ,http://
www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/index2.asp?p=7 (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
182. See id. For a discussion of the British public inquiry model, see Hegarty, supra
note 172, at 1156-59.
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Instead of examining the full breadth of violence during the Troubles,
the Bloody Sunday Inquiry concentrates on a single defining event in
Northern Ireland's history. 183 As such, it does not fall within the basic
definition of a truth commission. 184 Nonetheless, the Inquiry has
attempted to place Bloody Sunday within the larger political and social
context of Northern Ireland during the early years of the Troubles. For
example, in his opening statement to the Inquiry's tribunal, the British gov-
ernment's counsel went to great lengths in order to describe the tensions
prevailing in Derry and elsewhere in Northern Ireland at the time Bloody
Sunday occurred.18 5 The Inquiry also received expert reports concerning
the historical background to Bloody Sunday from two of Northern Ire-
land's leading academics. 18 6
The Bloody Sunday Inquiry is by no means, however, a perfect tem-
plate for official truth-seeking in Northern Ireland. The British public
inquiry model upon which the Bloody Sunday Inquiry is based is highly
complicated, rooted in legal formalism, and often adversarial-leading one
commentator to suggest that "those seeking a legal model for a truth com-
mission in Northern Ireland [should] . . .look elsewhere."'18 7 Moreover,
although the Inquiry's final report must be released before its merits and
drawbacks can be assessed properly, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry has been
constrained by further attempts by the British state to prevent its security
forces from being held accountable for their actions. Soldiers involved in
Bloody Sunday received significant legal assistance during the Inquiry, and
were granted the right to refuse to testify openly before the tribunal.' 88
Consequently, in order to hear testimonies from military witnesses, the tri-
bunal moved its proceedings from Derry to London. Soldiers and police-
men were disguised or screened off during their testimony, and in the
transcripts of the proceedings they are identified by letters (e.g. "Soldier
X") rather than by their names. 189 As a result, although the goal of the
Inquiry is to establish the truth regarding Bloody Sunday, and although the
Inquiry does not explicitly rule out the possibility of criminal prosecutions
183. Blair, supra note 180 (stating that the Inquiry is only charged with looking into
"the events of Sunday, 30thJanuary 1972 which led to loss of life in connection with the
procession in Londonderry on that day, taking account of any new information relevant
to events on that day").
184. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
185. Hearing Transcripts, Mar. 27, 2000, Bloody Sunday Inquiry, available at The
Bloody Sunday Inquiry, supra note 180 (follow "Hearing Transcripts" hyperlink; follow
"Transcript Library" hyperlink).
186. PAUL ARTHUR, EXPERT REPORT E6: HIsToRIcAL BACKGROUND TO BLOODY SUNDAY
(2000), available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/reports/ereports/Archive/
Arthur.pdf; PAUL BEw, EXPERT REPORT E7: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO BLOODY SUNDAY
(2000), available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/reports/ereports/Archive/
Bew.pdf.
187. Hegarty, supra note 172, at 1173.
188. Lord Saville of Newdigate v. Widgery Soldiers, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 2048 [57].
189. See The Bloody Sunday Inquiry, supra note 180 (follow "Hearing Transcripts"
hyperlink).
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resulting from its proceedings, 190 it appears that whatever "truth" emerges
from the Inquiry's report will be only partial, and that "justice" in the form
of criminal sanctions against those responsible for the fourteen deaths will
be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.
In addition to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, three additional public
inquiries into allegations of state violence have recently been convened in
Northern Ireland. The Hamill, Nelson, and Wright inquiries, all of which
deal with the issue of collusion between paramilitary organizations and
agents of the state, 19 1 were created in response to reports by Canadian
judge Peter Cory, who found that sufficient evidence of collusion existed in
these cases to warrant further investigations. 19 2 Like the Bloody Sunday
Inquiry, these three inquiries focus on highly significant and emotive
events. As such, they are at least theoretically well-positioned to provide
meaningful insight into the past, to uncover patterns of collusion between
the state and paramilitary groups, and to allow for the perpetrators of vio-
lence to be held accountable for their actions. In practice, however, the
inquiries are likely to be limited in their effectiveness by the new Inquiries
Act, 2005.193 Critics of the Act argue that it undermines the effectiveness
of public inquiries by allowing the British government to set their terms of
reference and limit public access to inquiry findings-even by going so far
as to prohibit the publication of certain information on the basis of "public
interest." 194 The Wright Inquiry was converted to the Inquiries Act in
November 2005,195 arguably to be used as a test run by the British govern-
ment in order to strengthen its case for applying the Act in future inquir-
190. See The Bloody Sunday Inquiry, Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/index2.asp?p=7 (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
191. Robert Hamill, a Catholic youth, was beaten to death by a Loyalist gang in 1997,
allegedly within sight of an RUC patrol that failed to intervene. See Robert Hamill
Inquiry, http://www.roberthamillinquiry.org (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). Rosemary
Nelson, a human rights lawyer, was killed when a bomb attached to her car exploded in
1999. Prior to the murder she had been the recipient of threats and abuse from RUC
officers. See Rosemary Nelson Inquiry, http://www.rosemarynelsoninquiry.org (last
visited Feb. 13, 2006). Billy Wright, jailed leader of the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)
paramilitary organization, was murdered by Republican fellow-prisoners under suspi-
cious circumstances in 1997. See Billy Wright Inquiry, http://www.billywrightinquiry.
org (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
192. CORY COLLUSION INQUIRY REPORT: ROBERT HAMILL (2004), available at http://
www.nio.gov.uk/cory-collusion-inquiry-.report.(without-appendices)-robert_hamill.
pdf; CORY COLLUSION INQUIRY REPORT: ROSEMARY NELSON (2004), available at http://
www.nio.gov.uk/cory-collusion-inquiry-report_(without-appendices)-rosemary-nel-
son.pdf; CORY COLLUSION INQUIRY REPORT: BILLY WRIGHT (2004), available at http://
www.nio.gov.uk/cory-collusion-inquiry-reportt(withoutappendices)billy-wright.
pdf.
193. Inquiries Act, 2005, c. 12 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/
acts2005/20050012.htm.
194. See Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, The Inquiries Bill: A Briefing
from the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission Oan. 2005), http://
www.nihrc.org/documents/landp/147.doc; British-Irish Rights Watch, The Inquiries
Bill: An End to Public Inquiries (Nov. 29, 2004), http://www.birw.org/
Public%20Inquiries.html.
195. See Jane Winter, British-Irish Rights Watch, Director's Report: November 2005,
(Nov. 30, 2005), http://www.birw.org/report%202005/Nov%2005.html (noting that
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ies-particularly any inquiry established to deal with the murder of Patrick
Finucane. Judge Cory recommended further investigation into Finucane's
murder in his 2004 reports,1 9 6 but concerns over the fairness and effective-
ness of the Inquiries Act have led Finucane's family to refuse to cooperate
in the establishment of an inquiry into the solicitor's death. 19 7
IV. Basic Proposals for a Northern Ireland Truth Commission
In all deeply divided societies, the process of transitional justice both
shapes, and is shaped by, the contours of the political settlement. 19 8 A
discussion of Northern Ireland's violent past and its current fragile peace
demonstrates that it is a society that could benefit from some form of offi-
cial truth-seeking. Nonetheless, given the complexities of the Northern Ire-
land situation, such truth-seeking faces significant obstacles. Does
Northern Ireland require a more stable political settlement before it can
seek truth, or does it need the common ground which the truth might pro-
vide before it can truly achieve a just and lasting peace?
This note contends that a process of official truth-seeking would bene-
fit Northern Ireland's peace process. Specifically, the truth commission
model provides a blueprint from which a truth-seeking process suitable to
meet the needs of Northern Ireland might be built. In order to understand
what a Northern Ireland truth commission might look like, it is therefore
necessary to return to the general observations this note has made regard-
ing truth commissions. 199
First, as is the case with truth commissions in other post-conflict soci-
eties, 200 a Northern Ireland truth commission must reflect the complex politi-
cal reality in which it operates. The May 2005 elections demonstrate the
extent to which political opinion in Northern Ireland remains bitterly
divided.2 0 1 In order for a truth commission to succeed, the province's
major political parties must support the process. So, too, must the myriad
community groups and human rights organizations that have involved
themselves in victims' rights and other issues in the wake of the Good Fri-
day Agreement. 20 2
As the actors responsible for the majority of the violence during the
Troubles, paramilitary organizations must also cooperate in the establish-
ment of a truth commission-or else be so marginalized by their political
the Wright Inquiry was converted despite the opposition of Billy Wright's family, their
lawyers, and concerned non-governmental organizations).
196. CORY COLLUSION INQUIRY REPORT: PATMCK FINUCANE (2004), available at http://
www.nio.gov.uk/cory-collusion-inquiry-report_(with-appendices)-patjfinucane.pdf.
197. See Chris Thornton, Finucane Family Locked in Wrangle, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, Oct.
26, 2005, at 1.
198. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
199. See supra Part I.
200. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
202. See Bell, supra note 74, at 1126-30, 1136-38 (describing the role of victims'
rights groups, non-governmental organizations, and community-based initiatives in aid-
ing the truth-seeking process).
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allies that they effectively become ostracized from Northern Ireland's polit-
ical dialogue. Paramilitary consent might be difficult to obtain; nonethe-
less, it is impossible to envision a successful truth commission operating in
a society where the threat of organized violence continues to impede politi-
cal discussion. The IRA's decision to end its campaign of armed violence
and put its weapons beyond use is a step in the right direction; Loyalist
paramilitary groups must now follow suit.20 3 By cooperating in a truth
commission process, paramilitaries would be able to engage in debates
with the rest of society regarding the justifiability or unlawfulness of their
past actions.
The governments of the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland must
also support the implementation of a truth commission. Britain, in partic-
ular, must be wholeheartedly committed to the process. This note has
shown the extent to which the British government has avoided accepting
responsibility for acts of state violence. 20 4 A Northern Ireland truth com-
mission would prove a hollow endeavor insofar as it is incapable of dealing
with the significant number of incidents in which British state actors con-
tributed to the violence of the Troubles. Britain must be willing to take
responsibility for its failures in Northern Ireland, and must allow its indi-
vidual actors to be held accountable for their crimes. A crucial aspect of
this requirement is for Britain to fulfill its obligations under Article 2 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, as outlined by the recent ECHR
decisions. 20 5
Any method of truth-seeking that falls solely under the auspices of the
British state, however, is likely to be regarded with suspicion by large seg-
ments of Northern Irish society owing to the failures of the British system
during the Troubles. 20 6 For this reason, while a viable truth commission
must operate with explicit governmental consent, it must also operate inde-
pendent of direct governmental oversight. An international dimension
would help provide a Northern Ireland truth commission with legitimacy.
The current peace process provides precedent for such a dimension: the
Good Friday Agreement itself was brokered with significant international
assistance, most notably from former U.S. Senator George Mitchell. 20 7
Similarly, the committee charged with overseeing the decommissioning of
Northern Ireland's paramilitaries is composed of international observ-
ers,20 8 and the Bloody Sunday Inquiry's tribunal contains judges from
203. There is evidence that Loyalist groups are moving in this direction. See Henry
McDonald, UVF Says the War is over at Last, THE GuARDIAN (UK), Feb. 12, 2006, availa-
ble at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/politics/story/0,,1708038,00.html (reporting that
the UVF has announced plans to disband, though not to surrender its arsenal of
weapons).
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207. See generally GEORGE J. MITCHELL, MAKING PEACE (1999) (providing a firsthand
account of the former Senator's role-and the role of the U.S. government in general-in
the negotiations leading up to the Good Friday Agreement).
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Canada and Australia. 20 9
Obtaining the necessary political consent for a Northern Ireland truth
commission will undoubtedly be a daunting process, especially insofar as
the truth-seeking process is conceptualized as a monolithic enterprise. A
Northern Ireland truth commission should build slowly through smaller,
confidence-building initiatives. Despite their flaws, both the Bloomfield
Report and the Bloody Sunday Inquiry hint at how such consensus-build-
ing might work. Like the Bloomfield Report, a Northern Ireland truth com-
mission should highlight the suffering of all victims while avoiding the
"hierarchy" that undermines the Victims' Commissioner's work.2 10 Its
goal in this regard should be to spark cross-community sympathy and to
break down the victims' mentality that traps both Unionists and National-
ists by emphasizing their own suffering while failing to recognize the suf-
fering of the other side.2 11
Furthermore, like the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, a Northern Ireland
truth commission might initially take the approach of investigating a series
of critical events, rather than tackling complex macro-issues surrounding
the Troubles. 21 2 Such a process, if pursued impartially and thoroughly,
could flesh out key aspects of the conflict. Instead of being guided by the
most salient issues left unresolved by the Good Friday Agreement, 2 13 and
allowing those issues to direct its examination of the Troubles in their
entirety, a Northern Ireland truth commission would prove most effective if
it deals with critical events first, and slowly builds to the point where an
overall picture of the conflict emerges. In other words, a truth commission
should follow a bottom-up, rather than top-down, approach. The use of the
public inquiry model is therefore a step in the right direction, but only
insofar as these inquiries are not restricted in their work by the Inquiries
Act.
Second, recognizing that "truth" and "justice" are inseparable concepts
in the process of transition,2 14 a Northern Ireland truth commission must
not sacrifice justice in its pursuit of truth. Owing to the continued role of the
British state in Northern Ireland, 2 15 as well as the often criminal nature of
paramilitary violence, 2 16 prosecutions can and should play a role in North-
ern Ireland's transitional process. Where evidence of responsibility for
past violence exists, perpetrators should face prosecution. Nonetheless,
the decision whether or not to prosecute in a particular situation should be
influenced by the needs of society as a whole. Northern Ireland must walk
a fine line between perpetuating past divisions through the unbridled pur-
suit of retribution, and perpetuating those same divisions by turning a
209. Bloody Sunday Inquiry, supra note 180, Frequently Asked Questions (follow
"Questions & Answers" hyperlink).
210. See supra Part III.A.
211. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
212. See supra Part III.C.
213. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 39-61 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 94-115 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 126-132 and accompanying text.
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blind eye towards the need for justice. As in other post-conflict societies,
walking that fine line in Northern Ireland will undoubtedly create discon-
tent amongst some segments of society.2 17 The goal of criminal prosecu-
tions should be to minimize that discontent while maximizing overall
societal good.
Britain must cooperate in the search for justice by accepting accounta-
bility for acts of state violence. The ECHR's Article 2 decisions place a
procedural obligation on the UK to conduct effective official investigations
into incidents where state actors are allegedly responsible for the unlawful
use of deadly force. 2 18 Additionally, the UK must seek continued reform
of Northern Ireland's policing and judicial systems in order to ensure that
both sides of the community view these systems as fair.
Justice-both for individual victims and society as a whole-implies
more than just the conviction of wrongdoers. To that end, reparations pro-
grams and other methods of assistance for victims of the Troubles, as rec-
ommended by the Bloomfield Report, should play an integral role in the
transitional process. 219 Already, the British government and Northern
Irish political bodies have established reparations schemes for the families
of both civilian victims and members of the security forces. 2 20
Lastly, and perhaps to a greater degree than in other post-conflict soci-
eties, 22 1 the primary goal of a Northern Ireland truth commission should be
achieving reconciliation. Reconciliation is likely to be a slow, arduous pro-
cess in Northern Ireland, yet it is necessary given the nature of the conflict.
The Troubles were not a conflict between a repressive, authoritarian regime
and its citizens, as was often the case in Latin America and Eastern Europe.
Nor were they a conflict between an obviously unjust minority government
and an oppressed majority, as was the case in apartheid South Africa.
Rather, the Northern Ireland conflict is between two deeply polarized com-
munities, divided by national identity, whose political, cultural, and eco-
nomic aspirations are equally valid.2 22 Until the gaps between these two
communities are bridged, Northern Ireland will never experience lasting
peace.
The Good Friday Agreement is at risk because Northern Ireland's
Unionist and Nationalist communities largely refuse to work together.2 23
This political impasse can only be overcome by breaking down the politics
of antagonism through greater cross-community cooperation and under-
standing, and by forging a communal narrative of the Troubles that
addresses the reasons for the conflict, as well as its individual and societal
costs. The establishment of an official truth-seeking mechanism would
217. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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assist in this process. A truth commission will not solve all of Northern
Ireland's problems overnight, any more so than similar bodies in other
post-conflict societies have served as a panacea for the lingering effects of
past violence.2 24 Nonetheless, a Northern Ireland truth commission can
provide a foundation for future peace by creating an atmosphere in which
political initiatives such as those contained in the Good Friday Agreement
are more likely to succeed.
Conclusion
Sadly, "it's to hell with the future and live on the past" sums up much
of Northern Ireland's history, and also sheds light on its current predica-
ment. Here, the idea of "living on the past" has two meanings. At the soci-
etal level, the past lives on-in fact, it is never really the "past" because it is
never really set aside. The past dictates the course of Northern Ireland's
present and future. At the individual level, many people in Northern Ire-
land "live on the past" because the past plays a significant role in shaping
their daily lives and their worldviews. As a result, the past perpetuates the
deep societal divisions that are the cause of Northern Ireland's violence.
A truth commission in Northern Ireland offers the hope of changing
the meaning of "living on the past." It ensures that the past is acknowl-
edged and understood-in Northern Ireland, the past is far too important
to be completely forgotten. Yet instead of allowing the past to remain the
dominant force in Northern Ireland's present and future, a truth commis-
sion would enable Northern Ireland to live on the past by building on it-
that is, by using the lessons of the past as the foundation for a more peace-
ful future. In this conception of "living on the past," the emphasis is less
on the past, and more on the living.
224. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.

